Abstract| We develop a formal framework of MAC policies in multilevel relational databases. We identify the important components of MAC policies and their desirable properties. The framework provides a basis for systematically specifying MAC policies and characterizing their potential mismatches. Based on the framework, we compare and unify the MAC policies and policy components that are proposed in the literature or imposed in existing systems. Our framework could be used to capture and resolve MAC policy mismatches in the trusted interoperation of heterogeneous multilevel relational databases.
I. Introduction
Multilevel security is a security model that captures the security requirements of military, government, and commercial organizations that are naturally hierarchical and compartmentalized. In such a model, subjects are assigned clearance levels and objects are assigned classi cation levels. These levels together with a dominance relationship between them form a security lattice 3]. Access by subjects to objects is controlled by a security policy, which is an interpretation of the security policy employed in manual systems. The implementation of multilevel security in databases results in multilevel databases.
As more multilevel databases are built and connected through computer networks, a wide variety of secure data sources will become accessible. A big challenge presented by this technology is the trusted interoperation of multilevel databases containing data with mismatched security policies. Providing trusted interoperation of multilevel databases not only makes it possible to reliably share data in isolated military and civilian databases, but also increases users' con dence and willingness in such sharing.
A. Problem
As a prerequisite to the trusted interoperation of multilevel databases containing data with mismatched security policies, the security policies of component databases, as well as the potential mismatches between them, have to be precisely characterized. The security policy of a multilevel database can be very complicated, ranging from high-level speci cations such as the type of access control (mandatory or discretionary) or the kind of model (noninterference or Bell-LaPadula), to designer's belief or preferences such as whether polyinstantiation is allowed, to low-level implementation decisions such as the number of levels allowed in a lattice. A formal policy framework is needed within which security policies could be characterized and compared 8]. As a rst step in this direction, we propose a formal framework for an important class of security policies: the mandatory access control (MAC) policy.
It has been widely accepted that a MAC policy consists of four components: a set of subjects, a set of objects, a lattice, and a mapping that associates levels in the lattice to subjects and objects 11]. This works ne with multilevel operating systems, because objects such as les do not carry semantics. For multilevel databases where data carry semantics, the same mapping of levels to objects such as elements in tuples could have completely di erent meanings 26]. For example, consider a relation SMD(Starship, MId, Destination). A secret label on element Rigel of tuple (Enterprise, 101, Rigel) in SMD could mean that the fact \Enterprise is going to Rigel" is secret, or the fact \some starships are going to Rigel" is secret, or even the word \Rigel" is secret. This confusion suggests that something critical is missing with the traditional formulation of MAC policies in multilevel databases, namely the semantics of object labels. This problem is crucial in the trusted interoperation of multilevel databases. For example, if the secret label on Rigel means that the fact \some starships are going to Rigel" is secret in database A, and means that the word \Rigel" is secret in database B, then unclassi ed subjects could query all destinations in database A and obtain \Rigel" through interoperation with database B. The canonical MAC policy for federated databases proposed in 18] does not solve this problem.
The formulation of a MAC policy in a multilevel database often includes some constraint policies, such as the labeling policy of Seaview 13] and the classi cation constraints of LDV 7] . Constraints are the most important means of specifying data semantics. However, the MAC policies in existing multilevel databases provide neither a precise de nition of constraint validity nor an ecient mechanism of constraint enforcement. In fact, it has been argued 1], 14] that integrity enforcement is in fundamental con ict with secrecy enforcement: no multilevel databases could simultaneously satisfy both integrity and secrecy requirements.
An important characteristic of MAC policies is the upward information ow in the lattice, which indicates the believability of low data at high levels. For multilevel operating systems where objects do not carry semantics, low data are always believed at high. For multilevel databases where data carry semantics expressed by constraints however, low data could contradict high data. For example, if we require that high SMD tuples have unique MId elements and (Enterprise, 101, Rigel) is a high tuple in SMD, then the low tuple (Enterprise, 102, Rigel) in SMD could not be believed at high. This problem suggests that the formulation of MAC policies in multilevel databases should provide means to constrain upward information ow.
Constraints also bring about the danger of inference channels. Inference channels could be obtained by observing the behavior of a database in enforcing the constraints. 1 In other words, the result of a low update could violate some constraints when combined with high data, but prohibiting the low update would enable the low subject to infer the existence of relevant high data. For example, consider another relation MT(MissionId, Type). If we require that every high MId element in SMD refers to a high or low MissionId element in MT, then prohibiting the deletion of a low MissionId element referred to by a high MId element would enable low subjects to infer the existence of the high MId element. Thus the formulation of MAC policies in multilevel databases should provide means to detect and remove such inference channels.
Existing research on security policies has focused on using rst-order logic to specify, analyze, and enforce the security requirements of an application (see for example 15], 16], 25], 28]). Security policies are formulated in terms of a set of subjects, a set of objects, and a set of rules governing the various modes of access of subjects to objects. There are several problems associated with applying this approach to MAC policies. The objects are usually the physical containers of data rather than the semantics of data, and are often too coarse in granularity (e.g., buildings in 15] and les in 16]). Moreover, rst-order logic is not expressive enough to capture the upward information ow in the lattice, or the dynamic behavior of a database in constraint enforcement. In addition, no methods are available to translate the logical statements in security policy speci cations to the labels and constraints in multilevel databases.
B. Overview of The Paper
We present a formal framework for MAC policies in multilevel relational databases. The main contributions are the identi cation of important components of MAC policies and their desirable properties, the provision of a basis for systematically specifying MAC policies and characterizing their potential mismatches, and the uni cation of MAC policies and policy components that are proposed in the literature or employed in existing systems.
In Section II, we describe our framework and identify the components of MAC policies. Besides the standard components of such policies, we identify three new components| an interpretation policy, a view policy, and an update policy|as essential for multilevel relational databases. In Section III we introduce the (single-level) relational model and the notion of atomic decomposition. In Section IV we formally de ne the multilevel relational model with tuplelevel labeling. In Sections V through VII, we investigate in detail the three most important new components of our policy framework.
In particular, Section V de nes an obvious interpretation policy for multilevel relational databases with tuplelevel labeling, through which a natural interpretation policy for multilevel relational databases with element-level labeling is then formulated. Section VI analyzes problems with existing view policies, identi es desirable properties of such policies, and presents a view policy that satis es these properties. Section VII analyzes problems with existing update policies, identi es desirable properties of such policies, and presents an update policy that satis es these properties.
Finally, Section VIII o ers some concluding remarks and a brief discussion on using our policy framework to capture and resolve the MAC policy mismatches in the trusted interoperation of heterogeneous multilevel databases.
II. A Policy Framework
We develop a model-theoretic foundation of multilevel relational databases. We then present a framework of MAC policies based on the foundation, and identify the components of our framework.
A. A Model-Theoretic Formulation
We distinguish between the actual world and a perceived world. A perceived world is a view of the actual world as perceived by a group of users. Information in a perceived world is the knowledge (of a group of users) of the truth value of a statement about the actual world 17], which could be either an elementary fact such as \Enterprise is on mission #101 to Rigel" or a general law such as \starships have unique missions".
A (single-level) relational database captures information in a perceived world|the view of the actual world as perceived by users of the database. Elementary facts are represented as tuples in relations, and general laws are represented as integrity constraints. For example, the elementary fact \Enterprise is on mission #101 to Rigel" could be represented by the tuple (Enterprise, 101, Rigel) in relation SMD, and the general law \starships have unique missions" is represented by a functional dependency SMD:
A standard model-theoretic formulation of a relational database is to interpret relation names as predicates, integrity constraints as axioms in a rst-order theory, and relations as forming a rst-order structure of the theory 17]. A database is valid if the structure is a model of the theory. For example, the tuple (Enterprise, 101, Rigel) in relation SMD is interpreted as a tuple in the assignment to predicate SMD, and the functional dependency SMD:
Starship ! MId is interpreted as the axiom (variables are universally quanti ed) SMD(x; y 1 ; z 1 )^SMD(x; y 2 ; z 2 ) ! y 1 = y 2 :
A multilevel perceived world is a family of perceived worlds organized into a lattice. A perceived world at a level in the lattice is the view of the actual world as perceived by subjects at that level. 2 Information in a multilevel perceived world is either information in the perceived worlds or knowledge of relationships between the perceived worlds. The former could be either a classi ed elementary fact such as \it is top-secret that Enterprise is on mission #101 to Rigel", or a classi ed general law such as \con -dential starships have unique missions". The latter could be a general law on classi cation such as \starships classied at all levels have unique missions". A multilevel relational database captures information in a multilevel perceived world. It consists of a relational database, whose integrity constraints are called view constraints, together with a labeling function and a set of labeling constraints. The labeling function maps every object in the database|relation, attribute, tuple, element in a tuple, view constraint, etc.|to a (possibly empty) set of levels in the lattice. The database and the labeling function together represent the family of perceived worlds, and the labeling constraints represent the general laws on classication. For example, the tuple (Enterprise, 101, Rigel) mapped to ts by represents the classi ed elementary fact \it is top-secret that Enterprise is on mission #101 to Rigel". As a view constraint, the functional dependency SMD: Starship ! MId mapped to c by represents the classi ed general law \con dential starships have unique missions". As a labeling constraint, the functional depen- A is a collection of axioms representing the labeling constraints. We use to denote the strict dominance subrelation, and to denote the transitive closure of . A multilevel structure of the multilevel theory is a family of rst-order structures fM l g l2L where M l is a structure of theory T l .
For example, the tuple (Enterprise, 101, Rigel) in relation SMD mapped to ts by is interpreted as a tuple in the assignment to predicate SMD ts in structure M ts , the 2 These perceived worlds di er, because the actual world allowed to be known and understood di ers for subjects at di erent levels. 
B. MAC Policy
We restrict ourselves to multilevel relational databases whose MAC policies have the simple security property and the -property of the Bell-LaPadula model 11], which ensure that information does not ow downward in the lattice. The Simple Security Property. A subject is allowed a read access to an object only if the former's clearance level is identical to or higher than the latter's classi cation level in the lattice.
The -Property. A subject is allowed a write access to an object only if the former's clearance level is identical to or lower than the latter's classi cation level in the lattice. Our formulation of a MAC policy in a multilevel relational database has eight components:
1. a lattice of levels, 2. a set of subjects, 3. a set of objects, 4. a mapping of subjects and objects to levels, 5. a set of labeling constraints, 6 . an interpretation policy, 7. a view policy, and 8. an update policy. The rst ve components together correspond to the traditional formulation of MAC policies in multilevel relational databases.
An interpretation policy maps a multilevel relational database to a multilevel theory and a multilevel structure of the multilevel theory. Through this policy, the supercial syntactic di erence in object labels is abstracted away, and the semantic di erence hidden in object labels is made precise. As a consequence, the interpretation policy makes it possible to compare the semantics of multiple MAC policies.
A view policy is a speci cation of the upward information ow|believability of low data at high levels. For every level, view constraints at that level are enforced on data believable at that level.
An update policy consists of a set of updates and a specication of the enforcement of labeling constraints on visible data in performing the updates, such that inference channels are eliminated in the enforcement.
In the rest of this paper, we investigate the last three components of our policy framework, using examples from multilevel relational databases based on the lattice in In other words, the atomic decomposition of a schema consists of, for every relation scheme, a relation scheme for the primary key, a relation scheme for every foreign key that is not in the primary key, and a relation scheme for every nonkey attribute. Notice that the atomic decomposition of a database does not contain 6 (by the de nition of the total projection operator ). This implies that null values in a database do not represent elementary facts, which coincides with our intuition. is the (unique) most informative such database that does not involve random choices. In Fig. 4 In other words, the label of every foreign key tuple dominates the label of the primary key tuple it refers to. A multilevel database (b; ) satis es the referential security property if every pair of multilevel relations involved in a referential dependency does. The multilevel database of Fig. 5 satis es polyinstantiation and referential security properties.
V. Interpretation Policy
An interpretation policy maps a multilevel schema to a multilevel theory and a multilevel database to a multilevel structure of the multilevel theory. Through this mapping, the super cial syntactic di erence in object labels is abstracted away, and the semantic di erence hidden in object labels is made precise. As a consequence, the interpretation policy makes it possible to compare the semantics of multiple MAC policies.
Here, we investigate the interpretation policies for two most common multilevel databases, namely multilevel databases with tuple-level and element-level labeling, where objects are tuples and elements in tuples, respectively.
A. Interpretation Policy for Tuple-Level Labeling
The interpretation policy for tuple-level labeling is straightforward. Because every tuple in a relation represents an elementary fact, the label of the tuple naturally represents the classi cation of the elementary fact.
Recall from Section IV that a multilevel schema is a In other words, the label of every foreign key dominates the label of the primary key it refers to. All properties derived here have been identi ed in the literature as desirable, indicating that our interpretation policy for multilevel databases with element-level labeling is natural. In particular, our properties 6.1 and 8 together with property 2.1 of Section III-A form the entity integrity as de ned in 10], 12]. Hence our interpretation policy provides a semantic justi cation of entity integrity. With the natural requirement that null values are not labeled, our property 7 is equivalent to the PI-FD property of 23]. Our properties 6.2 and 9 together with property 3.1 of Section III-A provide a formal de nition and semantic justication of referential integrity. Fig. 7 shows a multilevel database with tuple-level labeling, over the schema of Fig. 3 and the lattice of Fig. 1 . It is semantically equivalent to the multilevel database of Fig. 6 , because the two are mapped to the same multilevel theory and structure according to our interpretation policies. The null value in Fig. 6 has disappeared in Fig. 7 .
VI. View Policy
A view policy is a speci cation of the upward information ow|believability of low data at high levels, such that, for every level, view constraints at that level are satis ed with believable data at that level.
A. Existing View Policies
According to the Bell-LaPadula model, low data can be visible at high. However, since low data could contradict high data in terms of the high view constraints, visibility should be distinguished from believability.
The lter function 9], 12] and the security logic 5] proposed in the literature take one extreme position by equating believability to visibility, thus maximizing believability. However, integrity is compromised if a low tuple contradicts some high tuples with respect to the high view constraints, which leads to an invalid high database. For example, consider the following multilevel relation over the schema of Fig. 2 and the When querying the mission of Enterprise, >-subjects will get back both 102 and 103, which contradicts the view constraint at > that \starships have unique missions".
Smith and Winslett proposed a belief-based semantics of the multilevel relational model 27], which de nes a multilevel relational database as a set of unrelated single-level relational databases, one for every level. They made a clear distinction between visibility and believability, and took the other extreme position by allowing no low tuples to be believable at high, thus minimizing believability. Their semantics provides a foundation based on which other semantics could be compared. However a multilevel relational database that directly employs their semantics would no longer be multilevel|it would be a set of single-level relational databases in which there is no upward information ow cross levels. For example, consider the following multilevel relation over the schema of Fig. 2 and the back an empty answer. In NTML 29], Thuraisingham rst formalized the distinction between visibility and believability by a prooftheoretic semantics of the multilevel relational model, which consists of a nonmonotonic inference rule stating that low data are believable at high as long as they do not contradict high data. Given two low tuples labeled incomparably, what happens if either tuple does not contradict high data, but their combination does? To determine what is believable at high, the result of Thuraisingham's approach would depend on the (random) order in which the nonmonotonic inference rule is applied to these two tuples, which introduces ambiguity. For example, consider the following multilevel relation over the schema of When querying the mission of Enterprise, >-subjects will get back either 102 or 103 but not both. 6 B. Desirable Properties of View Policies From the above discussion on the problems associated with existing view policies, we could identify three desirable properties that a view policy should have:
1. believable data do not violate view constraints, 2. it maximizes upward information ow, and 3. it is deterministic.
In the rest of this section, we outline an atomic ow policy for multilevel databases with tuple-level labeling proposed in 21], where the view constraints consist of key and referential integrity properties, which satis es the desirable properties identi ed above.
C. View Policy for Tuple-Level Labeling
As we observed in Section II-A, a database represents one view of the actual world, while a multilevel database represents multiple views of the actual world|one for every level. Furthermore, these multiple views are constrained by the view constraints and are related by the lattice. Contained in the view at a level are tuples believable at that level.
Informally, our view policy states what tuples belong to the view at a level. First, all tuples labeled at that level should be part of the view. Second, for tuples labeled at lower levels, as many of them as possible should be part of the view as long as integrity is preserved, in order to maximize sharing. Third, in case that either but not both of two low tuples could be in a high view, neither of them should be in the high view, because the high view lacks further information to justify the preference of one over the other. In other words, view constraints serve as a lter on how much low data could ow high.
Recall from Section IV that a multilevel schema is a pair Fig. 8 .
The above de nition formalizes our intuition about views, and satis es the three desirable properties of view policies of Section VI-B, for the following reasons.
1. If the key integrity property is not satis ed in the l-view, then it cannot be satis ed by removing any low tuples from the l-view. If the referential integrity property is not satis ed in the l-view, then it cannot be satis ed by adding any low tuples to the l-view.
Thus, believable data do not violate view constraints. ). Our view policy is an extension of the Bell-LaPadula model, in the sense that we distinguish between two kinds of low data: those that are believable at high (e.g., the atomic tuple (Enterprise, Rigel)), and those that are visible but not believable at high (because they violate view constraints when combined with high data) (e.g., the atomic tuple (Enterprise, 102)). View constraints are enforced only on believable low data.
VII. Update Policy
An update policy consists of a set of updates and a specication of the enforcement of labeling constraints on visible data in performing the updates, such that inference channels are eliminated in the enforcement. In particular, if a low update violates labeling constraints when combined with high data, it should not be aborted. Instead it should be extended with necessary compensating high updates in order to enforce integrity, secrecy, and availability. An update policy speci es precisely what the compensating updates should be.
A. Existing Update Policies
Let us consider the restricted-value policy of 22] and the insert-low policy of 31], both of which are designed to enforce no-polyinstantiation. 7 For easy presentation, we adapt these policies to the context of multilevel databases with tuple-level labeling. If low subjects insert a tuple which has the same primary key as an existing high tuple, then either the low insertion has to be rejected, causing denial of service to low subjects and leading low subjects to infer the existence of the high tuple, or the high tuple has to be overwritten, causing denial of service to high subjects. Similarly, if high subjects insert a tuple which has the same primary key as an existing low tuple, then either the low tuple has to be deleted, causing denial of service to low subjects, or the high insertion has to be rejected, causing denial of service to high subjects.
The restricted-value policy and the insert-low policy are very similar. They both remove denial of service to high subjects. The example below illustrates these policies. Consider the following multilevel relation over the schema of Suppose that a >-subject wants to change explore to spy.
The restricted-value policy extends the update to:
1. Change explore to p at ?. The extended update ensures no-polyinstantiation at the price of causing denial of service to ?-subjects. The inference channels at update time remain, because an insertion of mission 101 by ?-subjects will be rejected, leading ?-subjects to infer that mission 101 has a high type. 8 7 No-polyinstantiation can also be enforced by having a more restricted schema, instead of an update policy. For example, the domain of primary key attributes can be partitioned such that primary keys for tuples labeled at di erent levels are disjoint 4]. 8 Both the restricted-value policy and the insert-low policy extend a high update with a low update to eliminate polyinstantiation. In order to avoid covert channels, such extension cannot be done automatically. Rather, it should involve a trusted user performing two B. Desirable Properties of Update Policies When a labeling constraint cannot be enforced in performing an update because of an inference channel, the low update could often be extended to a multilevel update that enforces the labeling constraint. We could identify four desirable properties that an update policy should have:
1. it does not introduce new inference channels, 2. it does not a ect data at lower or incomparable levels, 3. it does not cause denial of service, and 4. it should minimize the e ect on data at higher levels.
In 19], we have shown that no update policies exist for the no-polyinstantiation security property that have all these desirable properties, which indicates the inherent difculty of enforcing unconditional no-polyinstantiation. In the rest of this section, we outline an atomic upgrade policy for multilevel databases with tuple-level labeling proposed in 21], where the labeling constraints consist of polyinstantiation and referential security properties, which satis es the desirable properties identi ed above. C. Update Policy for Tuple-Level Labeling
For multilevel databases with tuple-level labeling, a low insertion will not contradict high tuples in terms of the polyinstantiation security property, because uniqueness is not enforced cross levels.
On the other hand, a low deletion could violate the referential security property if the deleted low tuple is referred to by high tuples through referential dependencies. To restore referential security, the low deletion could be extended with a high insertion of the atomic tuple containing the primary key of the deleted low tuple.
Recall from Section IV that a multilevel schema is a pair Let t be a tuple over X i . An update at level l has the form insert l j (t) or delete l j (t), which speci es, respectively, the insertion to or deletion from multilevel relation (r j ; j ) of tuple t at level l. (b) 0 j (t) = j (t) flg. Our update policy satis es the four desirable properties of update policies of Section VII-B, for the following reasons.
1. The compensating updates do not introduce new inference channels, because a low update that contradicts high tuples will never be aborted. 2. The compensating updates are at comparably high levels. For any level l 0 where l 6 l 0 , the l 0 -slice after an update at l remains the same. The l-slice after an update at l di ers from that before the update precisely in the e ect of the update. 
A. Summary
We have developed a formal framework of MAC policies in multilevel relational databases. We have identi ed eight components of such policies, and have characterized their desirable properties.
Besides the ve components in the traditional interpretation of MAC policies in multilevel databases, one of the most important new components is the interpretation policy. By mapping multilevel relational databases to multilevel theories and structures, the super cial syntactic difference in object labels is abstracted away, and the semantic di erence hidden in object labels is made precise. As a consequence, the interpretation policy makes it possible to compare the semantics of multiple MAC policies. As examples, we have developed natural interpretation policies for multilevel relational databases with tuple-level and element-level labeling, respectively, which have properties that are commonly recognized as desirable.
The second new component, the view policy, speci es the upward information ow such that, for every level, view constraints at that level are satis ed with believable data at that level. A view policy should have three desirable properties:
1. believable data do not violate view constraints, 2. it maximizes upward information ow, and 3. it is deterministic. As an example, we have developed an atomic ow policy for multilevel relational databases with tuple-level labeling with all these desirable properties, where the view constraints consist of key and referential integrity properties.
The third new component, the update policy, speci es the enforcement of labeling constraints on visible data in performing a set of updates, such that inference channels are eliminated in the enforcement. An update policy should have four desirable properties:
1. it does not introduce new inference channels, 2. it does not a ect data at lower or incomparable levels, 3. it does not cause denial of service, and 4. it should minimize the e ect on data at higher levels. As an example, we have developed an atomic upgrade policy for multilevel relational databases with tuple-level labeling with all these desirable properties, where the labeling constraints consist of polyinstantiation and referential security properties.
The components of a MAC policy could interact in complex ways. For example, the view policy of Trusted ONTOS 24] is equivalent to a totally ordered lattice plus NTML 29] as outlined in Section VI-A or the atomic ow policy of Section VI-C. We have also shown in 21] that, for multilevel relational databases with tuple-level labeling, the atomic ow policy of Section VI-C applied to the referential integrity property is equivalent to the belief-based semantics 27] as outlined in Section VI-A applied to the referential security property.
The framework provides a basis for systematically specifying MAC policies and characterizing their potential mismatches. Based on the framework, we have compared and uni ed the MAC policies and policy components that are proposed in the literature or imposed in existing systems.
B. Trusted Interoperation
Our policy framework could be used to capture and resolve the MAC policy mismatches in the trusted interoperation of heterogeneous multilevel databases. As a rst step in this direction, we have investigated the case when the MAC policies mismatch in the lattice component 6]. The lattice mismatches are captured in terms of cross-lattice dominance relationships speci ed by, say, a security ocer. Secret users of database A would be able to access sensative data in database B, if level secret in lattice A dominates level sensative in lattice B.
To interoperate between multilevel databases with mismatched interpretation policies, some with tuple-level labeling and some with element-level labeling, we utilize the mapping of element-level labeling to tuple-level labeling from Section V-B.2. Databases with element-level labeling would be transformed to virtual databases with tuplelevel labeling through atomic decomposition. Users of a database with tuple-level labeling would be able to access data in a database with element-level labeling through the corresponding virtual database. For example, a >-user of the database in Fig. 5 could query the type of the mission whose MissionId is 101. If this database interoperates with the database in Fig. 6 , then he could get back a tuple (101 m1 , spy m1 ), where the semantics of element-level labels might not be comprehensible to him. If instead, this database interoperates with the database in Fig. 7 , then he would get back a tuple (101, spy) m1 , where the semantics of the tuple-level label is understandable to him.
Suppose that we want to interoperate between two multilevel databases with mismatched view policies, database A with NTML 29] as outlined in Section VI-A and database B with the atomic ow policy of Section VI-C. Also suppose that database A has an empty SMD relation, and database B is as shown in Fig. 5 . If a >-user queries database B directly for the destination of Voyager, he would get back an empty answer. But if he queries database A, then he should get back either Rigel or Talos, from database B through interoperation.
Suppose that we want to interoperate between two multilevel databases with mismatched update policies, database A with the restricted-value policy and database B with the insert-low policy, as outlined in Section VII-A. Also suppose that both databases have a ?-tuple (101, Rigel) in relation MT, and updates to MT in one database are automatically propagated to the other. If >-users change Rigel to Talos in database A, then the ?-update to change Rigel to p should not be propagated directly to database B, because p would be foreign to users of database B. Instead, it should be replaced by the ?-deletion of (101, Rigel).
